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INTRODUCTION
Whether we are aware of it or not, the concepts of the fair
use
defense
to
copyright
infringement,
including
transformativeness, have affected our lives in some way. From
accessing the Google Books database and search engines to
conducting legal research, the American public has become
involved in a controversy surrounding copyright law and the
principles of fair use. Fair use is a defense to a copyright
infringement claim that courts determine based on four statutory
factors articulated in the Copyright Act.1 Interestingly, one
consideration not explicitly mentioned in the statute that courts
heavily weigh in deciding fair use is what has come to be known
as transformativeness.
As a subfactor of factor one—“the
purpose and character of the use”—transformativeness explores
the extent to which the use of a copyrighted work gives the
original a new purpose or meaning.2 This judge-created concept
has been applied more expansively since its inception, and the
rise of the digital age, with mass reproduction in digital form, has
led to a pivotal inflection point for reconsideration of the fair use
doctrine and transformativeness.
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1
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
2
Id.
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While copyright law has deep roots in the history of our legal
system,3 transformativeness in the context of fair use is a more
recent development. It was not until 1994, in Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc.,4 that the term became part of judicial analysis.
In that case, the United States Supreme Court reviewed a
copyright infringement action filed by a record label against
members of a rap group for what the rap group argued was a
parody use of the copyrighted song.5 The Court indicated that
parody could constitute fair use of a copyrighted work under the
first factor of the fair use analysis because it was
“transformative.”6 The Court adopted this “transformative”
concept from Judge Pierre Leval’s article, Toward a Fair Use
Standard,7 and determined that a transformative use of
copyrighted material is one that “adds something new, with a
further purpose or different character.”8
Since the Campbell case, federal courts have heard a
multitude of fair use cases and have decided them based in part
on this transformativeness concept. However, what began as a
check on the expansion of copyright and a way to balance societal
and copyright holders’ interests has since morphed into a broad
application by judges when they perceive a socially beneficial
use.9 As a result, some courts, such as the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, have recently rejected the
approach of examining whether a use is transformative in
circumstances where content is artistically altered because it
replaces the § 107 factors and potentially overrides authors’
derivative work rights.10
By contrast, other recent cases
involving digitized copyrighted sources have found verbatim uses
of those sources to be transformative because judges have
stretched their ideas of what a transformative purpose or use is,
and found that making a work digitally accessible inherently
3
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1108–
09 (1990) (discussing the original British copyright statute, the Statute of Anne of
1709, and quoting the statute whose purpose was “for the Encouragement of
Learned Men to compose and write useful Books.” (citing Act for the Encouragement
of Learning, 1709, 8 Anne, ch. 19)).
4
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
5
Id. at 572–73.
6
Id. at 578–79.
7
Id. at 579 (citing Leval, supra note 3, at 1111).
8
Id.
9
See infra Part II.
10
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014).
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changed the work.11
This continued expansion of
transformativeness may be problematic for the optimal balancing
of interests under copyright policy and may create more
confusion about what constitutes transformativeness as the
digital information age moves forward.
The digital information age has ushered in unprecedented
large-scale digitized scanning of millions of copyrighted works
available on the Internet and other digital mediums.12
Consequently, many aspects of copyright law, including fair use
and the rights of publishers and creators of works, are impacted
by this open access.13 Courts must now determine whether such
digital reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works qualify
as fair use, and authors and creators question their roles in this
process of amassing their works into digital libraries and
databases.14 Business models are affected by digitization, where
information was previously provided on a “pay-per-view” basis
and is now free or advertiser supported,15 and questions now
arise regarding whether there are efficient and cost-effective
licensing options available.16
This Note examines and ultimately argues against the
expansion of transformativeness in verbatim-copying cases, given
the implications it will have as more copyrighted works are
digitized. Part I discusses the background and objectives of the
Copyright Act, the fair use exception, and the rise of the
transformativeness subfactor. Part II provides a summary of
some predigitization fair use cases to establish some basic
principles about how courts have ruled on transformativeness.
Part III examines relevant cases recently decided on the question
of transformativeness in the context of mass digitization. Part IV
critiques the ways courts have arrived at their holdings,
specifically in overemphasizing societal benefits as a measure of
transformativeness and overstating the facts of certain cases to

11

See infra Part III.
Trudi Bellardo Hahn, Impacts of Mass Digitization Projects on Libraries and
Information Policy, ASS’N FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. BULL. (Oct./Nov. 2006), http://
www.asis.org/Bulletin/Oct-06/hahn.html.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LEGAL ISSUES IN MASS DIGITIZATION: A
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION DOCUMENT i−ii (Oct. 2011), http://
www.copyright.gov/docs/massdigitization/USCOMassDigitization_October2011.pdf.
12
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find a transformative purpose or character where one may not
exist. This section will also offer a more appropriate analysis
that courts should follow in determining whether certain cases of
verbatim-copying and digitization are transformative. Finally, it
will discuss some possible licensing options to abate the judicial
expansion of transformativeness.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT

The grant of copyright power to Congress is fundamental,
having been enumerated in the Constitution.17 This includes the
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”18
The United States Supreme Court has held that this clause lends
itself to the creation of copyright laws designed to further the
utilitarian goals of increasing the progress of knowledge for the
improvement of society.19 The underlying idea is that by
granting an author a limited monopoly on her writings and
works, she will become motivated to create literary and artistic
works that benefit society.20
The modern Copyright Act of 1976 protects “original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device.”21 Works protected under this
definition include literary, musical, pictorial, graphic, and
audiovisual works that express ideas, compilations, and
derivative works.22 An owner of a copyright has the exclusive
right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, publicly perform, and
publicly display his or her copyrighted works.23

17

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Id.
19
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(“[This] limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be
achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by
the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of
their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”).
20
Leval, supra note 3, at 1108.
21
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
22
Id. §§ 102−103.
23
Id. § 106.
18
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In furthering the utilitarian objectives of copyright law by
stimulating the production of creative works without impeding
incentives to create them, the Copyright Act provides an
exception to this monopoly: the fair use doctrine.24 The statute
provides that “the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not
an infringement of copyright.”25 The factors to consider when
determining if a use is covered by this doctrine are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.26

Although the fair use factors are statutorily created, courts
have developed their own means of interpreting the statute with
additional subfactors to consider.27 The first factor, the purpose
and character of the use and its commerciality, carries much of
the weight and is important in determining fair use.28 This is
evidenced by the fact that judges have focused much of their
discussions in fair use cases on the first factor compared to some
of the other factors.29 The subfactors of factor one have developed
separately through scholarly commentary and case law.30 While
the statutorily required commerciality inquiry became a
significant focal point after Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.,31 it was not until Judge Leval proposed that
courts shift their focus on the character and purpose of the use to
“transformativeness” that that nonstatutory subfactors gained
more attention in Campbell and subsequent cases.32 A court’s
analysis under this subfactor considers whether the new work
24

Leval, supra note 3, at 1110.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
26
Id.
27
Leval, supra note 3, at 1106.
28
Id. at 1111.
29
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions,
1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 587 (2008).
30
Id. at 597–98.
31
464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). Courts began focusing on commerciability after the
Supreme Court held that every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively unfair. Beebe, supra note 29, at 598.
32
Beebe, supra note 29, at 603.
25
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“merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ ”33 of the original work or adds
something new “with a further purpose or different character,
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”34
The Supreme Court has held that the more transformative a new
work is, the less significant the other factors will be in a finding
of fair use.35
Throughout the many transformative inquiries courts have
analyzed in fair uses cases, two main types have informed courts’
analyses under the first factor: transformative use and
transformative purpose.36 A transformative use repurposes the
copyrighted work to create a new work, such as a parody or other
artistic use of the work, and changes the work’s character.37 By
contrast, a transformative purpose exists when a copyrighted
work is copied verbatim but is put to a new purpose.38 Physical
changes are not necessary to find a transformative purpose;
where the work is put into a new context, given new insights, or
serves a different function than the original, courts may find in
The difference is that a
favor of transformativeness.39
transformative use produces a new work while a transformative
purpose takes an exact copy of the work and applies it to a new
purpose. The Supreme Court has thus far only addressed the
concept of transformativeness as it applies to parody in
Campbell—that is, transformative use—and not verbatim
copying.40
Against this evolutionary background, today’s technological
advancements, including the digitization of artistic and literary
works, have further complicated copyright law and the fair use
doctrine, and have created a problem for transformative purpose.
Since the electronic information age began and copyrighted
works started appearing on the Internet, courts have followed a
33
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (alteration in
original) (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.
9,401)).
34
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Leval, supra note 3, at 1111).
35
Id.
36
Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 836 (2010).
37
Id.
38
Michael D. Murray, What is Transformative? An Explanatory Synthesis of the
Convergence of Transformation and Predominant Purpose in Copyright Fair Use
Law, 11 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 260, 273 (2012).
39
Id.
40
Barry Sookman, The Google Book Project: Is It Fair Use?, 61 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC'Y U.S.A. 485, 497 (2014).
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trend in expanding the concept of transformativeness.41 In many
cases, courts have surprisingly found that verbatim copying and
digitizing of copyrighted documents were transformative because
they became part of an online search system.42 In the context of
books, the Copyright Office has adopted the term “mass
digitization” to encompass large-scale scanning and left open the
possibility that scanning fewer books may also qualify as mass
digitization.43 Music, photographs, and other works are also
capable of being mass-digitized.44 The Copyright Act did not
directly address mass digitization, so the issue requires
examining long-established copyright and fair use principles and
applying them to this new context.
II. EARLY CASES ESTABLISHING CONTOURS OF
TRANSFORMATIVENESS IN THE VERBATIM COPYING CONTEXT
To understand the development of transformativeness in
mass digitization cases today, it is helpful to examine some of the
early contexts in which this doctrine was applied to pre-mass
digitization verbatim copying. One of the earliest and most cited
cases involving verbatim copying is Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., where Universal City Studios and
other members of the film industry sued Sony for copyright
infringement of their television broadcasts.45 Sony manufactured
and sold Betamax video tape recorders that were able to record
commercially sponsored television programs broadcast on public
airwaves.46 The plaintiff studios alleged that some individuals
used Betamax recorders to record their copyrighted works on
television and had infringed their copyrights, and that the
defendant corporation was liable for selling the Betamax
recorders.47 The United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of
Sony, determining that the recording of copyrighted television
programs for later viewing was a noncommercial, nonprofit
activity for individuals watching privately at home.48 The Court
41
1 ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT,
PUBL. & THE ARTS § 1:31:70 (3d ed. 2004).
42
1 Information Law § 4:14, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015).
43
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 16, at 8–9.
44
Id. at 15.
45
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 449.
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determined that recording in this instance allowed viewers to see
a work they could have viewed for free at an earlier time—socalled “time-shifting”—and the fact that the entire work was
reproduced did not preclude fair use.49 In fact, the Court found
that there was no potential harm to the studio in the
broadcasting market, and that there was a public interest in
making television broadcasts more available to a wider
audience.50 This was one of the first times a court held that
reproducing a copyrighted work with no new purpose could still
pass the first factor of fair use.51
After the concept of transformativeness was introduced in
Campbell,52 it was applied in another well-known verbatim
copying case, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.53 The
defendant, Texaco, employed researchers to conduct scientific
research and develop new products and technology in the
petroleum industry, and subscribed to various scientific and
technical journals.54 The plaintiffs, publishers of the scientific
and technical journals, brought suit against Texaco for the
unauthorized photocopying of articles from their journals.55
Chickering, a chemical engineer at one of Texaco’s facilities,
reviewed published works in one of the publisher’s journals, and
was found to have photocopied articles from the journal and
stored them in his files for later use.56 Texaco asserted a fair use
defense, and the district court held that the copying was not
fair.57
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling, and determined
that Chickering had photocopied the articles for the same basic
purpose that subscribers would normally obtain the original
journal articles—“to have it available on his shelf for ready
49

Id. at 449–50.
Id. at 454.
51
Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1383, 1383 (2014).
52
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
53
60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
54
Id. at 915.
55
Id. at 914.
56
Id. at 915. It was presumed that many other employees at the facility had
done the same, but the parties agreed to choose one researcher at random as a
representative of the group to avoid expenses of exploring the photocopying practices
of each researcher. Id.
57
Id. at 914.
50
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reference if and when he needed to look at it.”58 Overall, the
Second Circuit found the purpose to be archival, primarily to
provide Texaco scientists with a copy of the original articles
without having to purchase more than one copy of the original
journal, and it “ ‘supersed[ed] the objects’ of the original
creation.”59 It held that “the making of copies to be placed on the
shelf in Chickering’s office [was] part of a systematic process of
encouraging employee researchers to copy articles so as to
multiply available copies while avoiding payment.”60 The court
noted that the use may lead to a public benefit of greater
research and technical developments, but that the defendant
would still reap an unfair economic advantage from the
unauthorized copying without paying the copyright holder.61
Importantly, the photocopying merely transformed the material
object embodying the intangible article from the journal format
to a photocopy, and did not transform the copyrighted article
itself.62 While it may have converted the original into a more
useful format:
[W]hatever independent value derives from the more usable
format of the photocopy does not mean that every instance of
photocopying wins on the first factor. In this case, the
predominant archival purpose of the copying tips the first factor
against the copier, despite the benefit of a more usable format.63

The Sixth Circuit also reviewed the issue of
In Princeton
transformativeness in verbatim copying.64
University Press v. Michigan Document Services,65 the defendant,
a commercial copyshop, reproduced substantial portions of
copyrighted scholarly works and bound them into coursepacks for
student use in reading assignments given by professors at the
University of Michigan.66 The copyshop did so without seeking or
obtaining permission from copyright owners, and the plaintiff

58

Id. at 918.
Id. at 919–20 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579
(1994)).
60
Id. at 920.
61
Id. at 922.
62
Id. at 923.
63
Id. at 924.
64
See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th
Cir. 1996).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 1383.
59
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publishers filed suit for copyright infringement.67 The district
court found that the copyshop did not have a fair use defense,
and on appeal, the Sixth Circuit agreed.68 In considering the
transformativeness of the coursepacks, the court stated, “If you
make verbatim copies of 95 pages of a 316-page book, you have
not transformed the 95 pages very much—even if you juxtapose
them to excerpts from other works and package everything
conveniently.”69
Transformativeness in the verbatim-copying context was
again analyzed by the Second Circuit in Infinity Broadcast Corp.
v. Kirkwood.70 In that case, the defendant, Kirkwood, designed
Dial-Up, a system that allowed customers to listen to radio
broadcasts around the United States by connecting a radio
receiver to a phone line.71 The receiver would receive broadcasts
over the air, transmit them into phone lines, and allow callers to
listen to whatever radio station to which the receiver was
tuned.72 The plaintiff owned a network of radio stations,
including stations in markets where Dial-Up had receivers, and
it owned certain syndicated programs broadcast in other markets
in exchange for a fee or advertising time.73 Upon learning that
Dial-Up users could gain access to and record radio programs
broadcast on its stations, it filed claims against the defendant for
copyright infringement.74 The district court held that Kirkwood’s
use was fair, but the Second Circuit reversed on appeal.75 While
the district court found transformative purpose in Kirkwood’s use
of the broadcast for information rather than entertainment, the
Second Circuit stated that a difference in purpose is not the same
as a lawful transformation.76 Kirkwood sold unaltered radio
broadcasts, and its target audiences did not exactly transform
the broadcasts either; they may not have been listening to
entertain themselves but they still derived entertainment value

67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1389.
150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 106.
Id.
Id. at 107.
Id.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 108.
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from them, rather than informational content.77 The court
reasoned that “[t]alent scouts, who admittedly would not be
listening in order to be entertained themselves, would
nevertheless be listening for the entertainment value of the
broadcasts rather than the factual content.”78 The court was also
unconvinced by the argument that the service provided the
societal benefit of enabling advertisers to confirm that their
commercials were being played.79 There were other means of
accomplishing that goal and it was not enough to overcome the
nontransformative retransmission.80
These earlier cases of fair use provide several basic
principles about transformativeness in the context of verbatim
reproduction. First, a change in the context of a work without
changing the content may be transformative if the purpose and
function of the new work is sufficiently different from the
original;81 however, without a new purpose that communicates a
new meaning, the subsequent use may fail.82 Second, archival
usage of original copyrighted works has “the potential to create a
new function and meaning for the work, and may meet fair use
objectives if the use has a proper purpose that is different from
exploitation of the creative original value and meaning of the
original work.”83 Third, simply copying the original work will not
meet the transformative requirement, even if there is an
educational or other general public benefit, unless there is a
change in the meaning and purpose of the work.84 Lastly,
copying a work that merely places it in a new medium of
communication without changing its purpose or meaning may
not be transformative.85

77

Id.
Id.
79
Id. at 108–09.
80
Id.
81
See id.; Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1389
(6th Cir. 1996); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir.
1994).
82
Murray, supra note 38, at 279–80.
83
Id. at 285.
84
Id. at 287.
85
Id. at 261. See also Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Grp., Inc., 150
F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that presenting an audiovisual work into a new
medium does not amount to transformative use where the content of the work is not
altered).
78
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III. CASES OF VERBATIM COPYING AND DIGITIZATION OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS
With the rise of mass digitization over the last decade,
copyrighted works have been reproduced on a much larger
scale.86 In such cases, many copyright holders have brought
infringement suits in response, but the courts have applied the
fair use and transformative inquiries differently compared to
previous verbatim copying cases.87 Public benefit has played a
larger role in courts’ analyses than previously, and even where a
second use has no new purpose, courts have surprisingly found
that the use is transformative largely based on their perceived
notions of a societal benefit.88 This section analyzes several
categories of cases where this expansion of transformativeness
has occurred. While many cases fall into overlapping categories,
this Note attempts to distinguish and organize them more
coherently.
A.

Internet Search Engines

Two seminal cases that exemplify courts’ evolving
approaches to the transformativeness of copies on Internet
search engines are Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.89 and
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.90 In Perfect 10, Google had an
agreement with Amazon whereby Amazon routed users’ search
queries to Google and transmitted Google’s responses back to
users.91 Plaintiff, Perfect 10, Inc., marketed and sold images of
nude models and offered a monthly subscription to users to view
password-protected images.92 It also licensed a third party to sell
and distribute reduced-size copyrighted images for download and
use on cell phones.93 When certain websites began republishing
Perfect 10’s images without authorization, Google’s search engine
began indexing the webpages containing the unauthorized
images and provided thumbnail versions of the images on its

86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 16, at 8–9.
See infra Part III.A–D.
See infra Part III.A–D.
508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2002).
Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1157.
Id.
Id.
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Google Image Search database.94 When a user clicked on the
thumbnail, “the user’s browser accesse[d] the third-party
webpage and in-line link[ed] to the full-sized infringing image
stored on the website publisher’s computer.
This image
appear[ed], in its original context, on the lower portion of the
window on the user’s computer screen framed by information
from Google’s webpage.”95
Perfect 10 claimed that Google’s display of its thumbnail
images and in-line linking to the full-sized images infringed
Perfect 10’s copyright in those images and sought a preliminary
injunction.96 Google asserted a fair use defense.97 The district
court granted in part and denied in part the preliminary
injunction against Google and denied the preliminary injunction
against Amazon, and Perfect 10 appealed.98
In reviewing the transformativeness factor, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit looked to Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp.,99 where a photographer brought suit against
Arriba, operator of an Internet search engine, for copyright
infringement.100 This search engine also provided thumbnail
images of copyrighted photographs, and the Ninth Circuit held
that these thumbnail images were transformative because of the
transformative nature of a search engine’s function and its public
benefit.101 That is, Arriba’s use of the images served a different
purpose and function than the photographer’s, and such use
improved access to information on the Internet.102 Relying on the
holding from Kelly, the court in Perfect 10 likewise determined
that a search engine is transformative because it “transforms the
image into a pointer directing a user to a source of information”103
and is socially beneficial because it “incorpor[ates] an original
work into a new work, namely, an electronic reference tool.”104
Contrasting this case with Infinity Broadcast Corp. v.

94

Id.
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 1163.
98
Id. at 1157.
99
336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
100
Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1164 (citing Kelly, 336 F.3d at 815–16).
101
Id. (citing Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818–22).
102
Id. at 1165 (citing Kelly, 336 F.3d at 819).
103
Id.
104
Id.
95
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Kirkwood,105 where a broadcaster’s retransmission of a radio
broadcast was not transformative since its purpose and meaning
were the same as the original, the Ninth Circuit held that
Google’s use of Perfect 10’s images as thumbnails provided “a
new context to serve a different purpose.”106 Moreover, the
significantly transformative nature of Google’s use and the public
benefit provided by its search engine outweighed any
superseding or commercial aspects of its use of Perfect 10’s
images.107
B.

Mass Digitization for Student-Oriented and Research
Purposes

Similar to the copying in Texaco, digital copying and
archiving involves making copies of a work and storing them
digitally on a server for access at any time.108 This mass
digitization has recently become an issue in the context of
student-related uses and general research needs.109 However,
courts are split on the issue. Some courts have found this type of
digital copying transformative since its purpose is different from
that of the original, while others find no new purpose just
because the copying is digital.
In A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC,110 plaintiff
students brought suit against iParadigms for copyright
infringement of essays they wrote for submission to their high
school teachers through the defendant’s online plagiarism
detection service.111
The defendant owned and operated
“Turnitin Plagiarism Detection Service” which allowed high
school and college educators to evaluate the originality of their
students’ work.112 A school could subscribe to iParadigms’
service, and students would be required to submit their work
through the web-based system.113 Turnitin would then compare

105

150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998).
Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165.
107
Id. at 1166.
108
Dale Flecker, Digital Archiving: What Is Involved?, EDUCAUSE REVIEW
(Jan./Feb. 2003), https://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/erm0316.pdf.
109
See infra Part III.B.
110
562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
111
Id. at 633–34.
112
Id. at 634.
113
Id.
106
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the students’ work with content already available online.114 The
students’ work would subsequently become archived for future
comparisons.115 But for this process to occur, students had to
agree through a “Clickwrap Agreement” when creating a profile
to use the service.116
Four high school students brought suit against iParadigms,
claiming that they submitted a disclaimer on their assignments,
which objected to the archiving of their work.117 In reviewing the
defendant’s fair use defense, the district court held that
iParadigms’ use of the plaintiffs’ work was transformative
because “its purpose was to prevent plagiarism by comparative
use, and that iParadigms’ use of the student works did not
impair the market value for high school term papers and other
such student works.”118 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that
while the commercial factor of the analysis tended to weigh
against fair use, it had to be weighed alongside the other factors
and was thus not determinative.119 The plaintiffs argued that the
district court erred in holding that iParadigms did not add
anything new to a work to make it transformative, but simply
stored the work in its archives.120 They argued in the alternative
that iParadigms still failed the transformativeness test because
its service did not always prevent plagiarism and therefore did
not have a transformative purpose.121 The appellate court
disagreed, holding that “[t]he use of a copyrighted work need not
alter or augment the work to be transformative in nature.
Rather, it can be transformative in function or purpose without
altering or actually adding to the original work.”122 Furthermore,
the court determined that the use did not need to achieve its
purpose perfectly, and that iParadigms’ use of the works was
transformative because it was “completely unrelated to
expressive content” and was intended to discourage plagiarism.123

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Id.
Id.
Id. at 635.
Id.
Id. at 636.
Id. at 639.
Id.
Id. at 639–40.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 640.
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Another case involving the issue of digital copying is
Cambridge University Press v. Becker.124
Plaintiffs were
university presses that published scholarly books and journals,
marketed these books to professors in colleges and universities,
and even sent them complimentary copies.125 Georgia State
University maintained an electronic uLearn course management
system and used ERES, an online reserves system of digital files,
to distribute course material.126 Professors at the university
posted excerpts of copyrighted works on ERES for student
access.127 There were seventy-five excerpts of copyrighted books
at issue, selected from sixty-four books by twenty-three
professors, which on average made up 10.1% of pages in the
copyrighted books.128 The school’s Copyright Policy included a set
of fair use factors that professors were to consider before
distributing copyrighted materials.129 Moreover, professors were
told at training sessions that copying as much as 20% of the
copyrighted source would be ideal to pass the fair use test.130
Students could then access these copyrighted readings from the
ERES system and could print, save, and download copies of the
readings.131
In 2008, Cambridge University Press and other academic
publishers brought suit against Georgia State University officials
for copyright infringement in the form of electronically posting
unlicensed portions of copyrighted books and making them
electronically available to students.132 The plaintiffs sought
injunctive and declaratory relief and attorney fees.133 The
defendants argued, among other things, that there was no
copyright infringement and claimed the defense of fair use.134
In reviewing the defendants’ fair use defense, the district
court looked to Campbell and the language of § 107 of the
Copyright Act for guidance, determining that the first factor—the
124
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012),
rev’d sub nom. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014).
125
Id. at 1211.
126
Id. at 1218.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 1218–19.
129
Id. at 1219.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 1220.
132
Id. at 1201.
133
Id.
134
Id.
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purpose and character of the use—favored the defendants.135 The
plaintiffs argued that the straight copying of copyrighted sources
onto the ERES system was nontransformative; they relied on
cases such as Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp.,136
which involved commercial copiers that produced printed
coursepacks using copyrighted materials but unsuccessfully
attempted to characterize their copying as noncommercial and
nonprofit.137 The court in Cambridge University Press largely
found for the defendants based on the education-prompting
language in § 107, which states that “the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as . . . teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
It agreed, however, with the plaintiff’s
copyright.”138
characterization of the copying as nontransformative.139 That
characterization did not preclude fair use since “[t]he obvious
statutory exception to this focus on transformative uses is the
straight reproduction of multiple copies for classroom
distribution.”140
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the
It agreed that the defendants’ use was not
case.141
transformative since the excerpts of the plaintiffs’ works posted
on ERES were mere verbatim copies of the original works; they
were simply converted into digital format and gave the copies no
new meaning.142 The secondary use was done with the same
intrinsic purpose as the original—to provide students with
Further, while
reading material for university courses.143
electronic reserve systems enhanced and simplified access to
excerpts of the plaintiffs’ works, they did not transform those
works, but merely superseded the objects of the original

135

Id. at 1224.
758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
137
Cambridge Univ. Press, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1224.
138
17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (2012); Cambridge Univ. Press, 863 F. Supp. 2d at
1224–25.
139
Cambridge Univ. Press, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1224–25.
140
Id. at 1224–25 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579,
n.11 (1994)).
141
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2014).
142
Id. at 1263.
143
Id.
136
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creation.144 However, despite the nontransformative nature of
the use, the court still found that the use satisfied factor one of
§ 107 due to its educational purpose and noncommercial
nature.145 The court stated:
Although GSU certainly benefits from its use of Plaintiffs’
works by being able to provide the works conveniently to
students, and profits in the sense that it avoids paying licensing
fees, Defendants’ use is not fairly characterized as “commercial
exploitation.” Even if Defendants’ use profits GSU in some
sense, we are not convinced that this type of benefit is indicative
of “commercial” use. There is no evidence that Defendants
capture significant revenues as a direct consequence of copying
Plaintiffs’ works. At the same time, the use provides a broader
public benefit-furthering the education of students at a public
university.146

Accordingly, while it did not find a new purpose that made the
use transformative, the Eleventh Circuit still focused on the
public benefit of furthering education as part of its rationale for
finding an educational, noncommercial use.
C.

Digital Libraries

The rise of digital libraries or repositories, where users scan
and aggregate books digitally, which are accessible over a
network,147 has led to lengthy litigation involving whether these
uses are copyright infringements.
Digital libraries store
collections of information systematically, and, unlike other types
of digital repositories, “information is organized on computers
and available over a network, with procedures to select the
material in the collections, to organize it, to make it available to
users, and to archive it.”148 Two major cases to come out of this
digital library dispute are Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust149
and Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc.150

144

Id.
Id. at 1263, 1267.
146
Id. at 1267.
147
WILLIAM Y. ARMS, DIGITAL LIBRARIES 2 (2015), as reprinted in
Definitions
of
Digital
Library,
WASHINGTON
&
LEE
UNIVERSITY,
http://home.wlu.edu/~whaleyt/classes/DigiLib/Whaley/Definition.html (last visited
Apr. 13, 2016).
148
Id.
149
755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).
150
954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015).
145
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In Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, several research
universities, including the University of Michigan, the University
of California at Berkeley, Cornell University, and the University
of Indiana, allowed Google to electronically scan the books stored
in their collections.151 In 2008, thirteen universities announced
that they were forming an organization called HathiTrust to
create a digital repository for the digital copies.152 HathiTrust
would create a library known as “HathiTrust Digital Library,” or
“HDL,” containing over ten million works.153 HDL permitted the
general public to search for terms across all the digital copies in
the library and only showed the page numbers on which the
search terms were located and the number of times the search
term appeared on the page.154 It did not display text from the
copyrighted work to the users, so the users could not view the
page or any other part of the copyrighted source.155 However,
member libraries permitted patrons with print disabilities to
access the full text of the copyrighted material and allowed them
to create replacement copies of the works.156 HDL stored copies
of the works on servers across the member universities with the
full text of the work and images of each page in the work as they
appeared in print version.157
The Authors Association sued HathiTrust for copyright
infringement, and the district court granted summary judgment
in favor of HathiTrust on fair use grounds.158 On appeal, the
Second Circuit described transformativeness as a use that
“serves a new and different function from the original work and
is not a substitute for it.”159 With respect to search functionality,
it found that the HDL had to create digital copies of all
copyrighted books to carry out this transformative use and only
permitted users to search for terms.160 In the Second Circuit’s
view, this was different in “purpose, character, expression,
meaning, and message from the page (and the book) from which

151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

755 F.3d at 90.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 91.
Id.
Id. at 91–92.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 92–93.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 98.
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it [was] drawn.”161 This was a different purpose from the original
since authors did not create these works for the purpose of
enabling a text-searchable database.162
The court further
explained that compared to other cases where it approved a use
as transformative,163 the use in this case was even more
transformative because full-text search capabilities added more
to the copyrighted materials.164 By contrast, providing access to
the print-disabled person was not transformative in the court’s
view because the underlying purpose of HDL’s use was the same
as the authors’ original purpose.165 The format was changed to
one that was accessible to the disabled, but the underlying
purpose of HDL’s use was to allow the authors’ books to be
read.166 Simply enabling a new audience to access a copyrighted
work did not pass the transformativeness test, although the use
was still ultimately fair.167
In a related case, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,168 the
Authors Guild sued Google for copyright infringement after the
search engine scanned copyrighted books and included them in a
digital library on its Google Books database.169 The books were
available for its library project partners to download, and
excerpts of the books were displayed to the public.170 The district
court found Google’s use to be transformative.171 According to the
court, this digital library was a research tool for other libraries,
and it digitized books and transformed the text into an index that
allowed users to find other books.172 It reasoned:
The display of snippets of text for search is similar to the
display of thumbnail images of photographs for search or small
161

Id. at 97.
Id.
163
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that the
Second Circuit found certain photograph collages were transformative, even though
the collages were cast in the same medium as the copyrighted photographs). It also
compares it to the transformative use found in Perfect 10, iParadigms, and Kelly.
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 97–98.
164
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 97.
165
Id. at 101.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 101–02. A third use, copying for preservation, was deemed not
appropriate for determination by the court. Id. at 103–04.
168
954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015).
169
Id. at 286–89.
170
Id. at 289.
171
Id. at 291.
172
Id.
162

FINAL_VALENTE

2016]

8/25/2016 12:33 PM

TRANSFORMATIVENESS

253

images of concert posters for reference to past events, as the
snippets help users locate books and determine whether they
may be of interest. Google Books thus uses words for a different
purpose—it uses snippets of text to act as pointers directing
users to a broad selection of books.173

Furthermore, the court stated that Google Books was not created
to read books, but created new information and transformed book
text into data for research in unprecedented ways.174 Google
Books provided a public benefit in that readers, scholars,
researchers, and libraries were able to easily find books, and so
the use was “highly transformative.”175 Although the court
acknowledged that Google would benefit commercially from the
digital library since it would draw more users to its website, the
court determined that the educational benefit the use provided
was more important, thus it determined that factor one favored
fair use.176
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of
transformativeness.177 The court stated that transformative
works have the purpose of commenting, criticizing or providing
information about the original work, and do not necessarily
involve a change or transformation in form like derivative works
do.178 The search function of Google’s digital library had the
transformative purpose of providing users with information
about the original works according to the court, and “Google
allows readers to learn the frequency of usage of selected words
in the aggregate corpus of published books in different historical
periods. . . . [T]he purpose of this copying is the sort of
transformative
purpose
described
in
Campbell . . . .”179
Furthermore, the snippet view added to the library’s highly
transformative purpose because it identified books of interest to
the user by providing just enough context for the user to know if
a work is responsive or not.180 The commerciality of Google’s use
did not dissuade the court from a fair use finding because of the
highly transformative purpose of the digital library, and because
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 291–92.
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 205 (2d Cir. 2015).
Id. at 215–16.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 217–18.
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many of the other accepted fair use purposes, such as
commentary, criticism, and parody, are conducted for profit as
well.181
D. Databases of Legal Documents
White v. West Publishing Co. exemplifies an instance where a
copyright owner contested his legal works being placed on
Internet databases.182 In White, the plaintiff filed suit for
copyright infringement against West Publishing Corp. and Reed
Elsevier, Inc. when he discovered that the briefs he wrote on
behalf of clients for litigation were included on the Westlaw and
The
LexisNexis databases without his authorization.183
documents were converted into text-searchable electronic files
and saved in the databases’ formats.184 Editors then reviewed
the documents and redacted private information, coded and/or
extracted key characteristics from the documents to allow users
to find the documents, and linked the documents to decisions or
other filings in the same or related cases.185 The court provided
two reasons for deeming this use transformative.186 First, White
had created the brief on behalf of his client for purposes of
litigation, while the publishing corporations used it to create an
Second, the corporations
interactive legal research tool.187
“add[ed] something new, with a further purpose or different
character”188 from the briefs in reviewing, coding, linking, and
converting the documents into the documents on its databases.189
While the purpose may have been commercial, the court stated
that the transformative nature of the use outweighed this
factor.190 Furthermore, although the use did not do much to alter
the content of the work, the court followed a view of
transformativeness that examined a purpose different from the
original and the addition of some new element to the document.
The defendants’ use of the briefs as part of an interactive legal
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190

Id. at 218–19.
White v. West Publ’g Corp., 29 F. Supp. 3d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Id. at 397.
Id. at 398.
Id.
Id. at 399.
Id.
Id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
Id. at 399.
Id.
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research tool was enough for the court to determine it was
transformative in purpose, possibly implying that the court saw a
public benefit in what the defendants had done.
IV. ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS
Courts have applied factor one of the fair use doctrine to
mass digitization cases in a contorted variety of ways191, and
some of these approaches have been too broad and potentially
harmful. Many courts have strayed from the statutory language
of § 107 and earlier fair use cases. They have imposed judgemade transformativeness exceptions in setting out how fair use
should be applied to copyrighted works that have been
transferred from their original medium onto a digital format. An
analysis of how courts have strayed from previously established
transformativeness doctrine and applied a broader concept in the
new context of mass digitization follows.
A.

Changes in How Courts Have Applied Transformativeness in
Mass Digitization Cases

1.

Lack of a New Purpose with a New Meaning

Transformativeness has been interpreted as creating a new
work that alters the original with a new expression, meaning,
insight or message, and does not merely supersede the original.192
As
established
early
on
in
Texaco
and
Infinity,
transformativeness turns on whether the use of a copyrighted
work has a new purpose, which creates a new meaning.193 In
both of those cases, that new purpose was not established since
the secondary works were merely verbatim copies of the original
and were used for the same purposes of retaining original journal
articles and listening to a transmission of a radio broadcast.194
However, courts recently found in favor of transformativeness
where no new purpose exists.195 In many of the cases mentioned
earlier, with the exception of Georgia State University and
HathiTrust, the courts have determined that the fact that the
191

See supra Part III.
See Fair Use in Digital Works, supra note 42.
193
See supra Part II.
194
Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998); Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 918 (2d Cir. 1994).
195
See supra Part III.
192
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original work was digitized and aggregated in an electronic form
somehow transformed it in a new and insightful way with a
different purpose from the original.196 These courts have held
that the existence of digital versions of the copyrighted sources
added a layer of transformativeness to the use where previously,
similar uses may not have been transformative.197 For example,
although it was done for the purpose of spreading information
rather than entertainment, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Infinity Broadcast Corp. reasoned that
the retransmission of radio broadcasts from distant cities was not
transformative.198 However, the court noted that a difference in
purpose is not the same as transformativeness.199 Kirkwood’s
retransmission of the broadcast left its character unchanged, and
the court found no new expression or meaning in it.200 Further,
the court stated that talent scouts—the audience of these
transmissions—would be listening for informational value, but
would still receive the entertainment value of the content rather
than the factual content.201
In some cases discussed in Part III, such as Perfect 10, White,
and Google, the purpose of the secondary use persuaded the
courts to find that the use was transformative without much
change to its character or meaning.202 Perfect 10 illustrates this
judicial expansion of the new purpose principle: the images in
Google’s search engine were claimed to have a different purpose
from the original because a search engine is inherently
transformative—it turns copyrighted images into pointers that
direct users to information.203 This argument seems tenuous for
a number of reasons. First, comparing this case to Infinity
Broadcast Corp., the audience would still derive the original
benefit from this secondary use. The Second Circuit stated in
Infinity that the talent scouts could still be entertained from the
informational broadcasts.204 Here, while Google and Arriba
provided these thumbnail images as links to other informational
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204

See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
Infinity Broad., 150 F.3d at 108.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part III.
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007).
Infinity Broad., 150 F.3d at 108.
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websites, they are still linking to the full-size images from which
users will derive the original entertainment value and compete
with plaintiff’s copyrighted images. Because these thumbnail
images happened to be digitized, the court found they served a
transformative purpose.
Second, smaller, lower-resolution versions of a copyrighted
image should not necessarily be seen as transformative. In
Gaylord v. U.S., the Federal Circuit determined that a stamp
displaying images of a Korean War memorial sculpture, called
The Column, was not transformative in character.205 While the
stamp portrayed an image of the sculptures surrounded by snow
and muted the color to suggest “a dream-like presence of ghostly
figures,”206 the court found no transformation of character,
meaning or message.207 Snow and muted color changed nothing
about the character of The Column. If a small-sized stamp of an
image of a sculpture is not seen as transformative in character, it
is questionable why a smaller and lower-resolution copy of a
photograph could be seen as such just because it is part of an
electronic search engine. While the image acts as a pointer to
sources of information, it still directs users to an unlawful fullsize version of the copyrighted image. The holding in Perfect 10
effectively muddles the already unclear understanding of what
constitutes transformative use and could lead to more confusion
in future cases involving digitization of copyrighted materials.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit did acknowledge that Perfect
10 licensed a third party to sell and distribute its reduced-size
copyrighted images for download and use on cell phones.208
Mobile users could download and save the images from Google
and use them on their cell phones for free rather than purchase
Perfect 10’s copyrighted images,209 which would suggest that
Google’s use superseded Perfect 10’s use and interfered with the
market for these types of images. Instead, the Ninth Circuit, at
an early stage of the proceedings, concluded that “the
transformative nature of Google’s use is more significant than
any incidental superseding use or the minor commercial aspects

205
206
207
208
209

Gaylord v. U.S., 595 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1373–74.
Id.
Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1157.
Id. at 1165–66.
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of Google’s search engine and website.”210 In this way, the Ninth
Circuit expanded the previous concept of a new purpose that does
not exploit the original’s value, and found that even when
secondary use provides the same value as the original and
supersedes the commercial rights of the copyright holder, a use
can still be transformative.
The Eleventh Circuit’s rationale in Cambridge University
Press was more consistent with prior findings of
transformativeness, such as the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in
Princeton University Press.
Its finding that Cambridge
University Press had not made a secondary use of the original
with a new purpose was based on the fact that the purpose for
the use was the same—to provide university students with
reading material.211 It exploited the original’s value and meaning
because it superseded the University’s need to purchase more
reading materials for students.212 As in Princeton University
Press, copying and providing students with course materials was
not transformative and did not have a new purpose from that of
the original work’s purpose. The court’s holding is also more in
line with earlier fair use cases such as Campbell, which
established that transformativeness adds a new purpose and
meaning to a work and does not supersede the value of the
original.213
2.

Expansion of Educational and Social Benefit Considerations
Beyond Statutory Limits

Section 107 states that the first factor to consider under a
fair use exception is “the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes.”214
Beyond referring to
educational purposes, this provision does not mention
considerations of a general social benefit derived from the use.
Since the 1976 Copyright Act was enacted, social benefit
considerations have been part of courts’ analyses of the first
factor of § 107, and they further the objectives of copyright in the

210
211
212
213
214

Id. at 1167.
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1263 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1992).
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progress of the arts.215 However, courts have increasingly begun
to find transformativeness based largely on a perceived public
benefit from such verbatim copying regardless of a lack of a new
purpose.216 This trend runs counter to United States Supreme
Court precedent. In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises,217 the Court stated:
It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to
accord lesser rights in those works that are of greatest
importance to the public. Such a notion ignores the major
premise of copyright and injures author and public alike. “[T]o
propose that fair use be imposed whenever the ‘social value [of
dissemination] . . . outweighs any detriment to the artist,’ would
be to propose depriving copyright owners of their right in the
property precisely when they encounter those users who could
afford to pay for it.”218

Earlier precedent established that merely copying an original
work should not count as transformative even if there is an
educational or social benefit of the copy. The court in Texaco
found that the secondary use of the photocopied journal articles
could not pass as transformative, regardless of the potential for
more efficient research processes and greater scientific
developments, since the use superseded the journal’s original
creation.219 By contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Kelly held that the
thumbnail images at issue were transformative because a search
215
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“Like less ostensibly humorous forms of
criticism, it can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in
the process, creating a new one.”); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2607 (2009) (“While agreeing that Accolade had a
commercial purpose in making copies of Sega games, the court thought that Sega's
insistence that it must presume unfairness was ‘far too simple and ignores a number
of important considerations.’ A closer look at Accolade's purpose revealed that it had
the legitimate and nonexploitative purpose of studying the functional requirements
for achieving compatibility with the Genesis console. The court was, moreover, ‘free
to consider the public benefit resulting from a particular use,’ which in Sega had ‘led
to an increase in the number of independently designed video game programs offered
for use with the Genesis console,’ which was ‘precisely the kind of growth in creative
expression . . . that the Copyright Act was intended to promote.’ ” (quoting Sega
Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. 977 F.2d 1510, 1522–24 (9th Cir. 1992) (footnotes
omitted)).
216
See infra Part IV.A.2.
217
471 U.S. 539 (1985).
218
Id. at 559 (quoting Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1615 (1982)) (alterations in original).
219
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2nd Cir. 1994).
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engine is transformative in nature and provides a public
benefit.220
By enhancing Internet users’ ability to gather
information, Arriba Soft was promoting the goals of the
Copyright Act.221 The court did not elaborate further on why a
public benefit was such a substantial part of the transformative
use finding, but it seemed to circularly hold that the use was
transformative because it was fair.222 Similarly, in Perfect 10, the
Ninth Circuit again held that the search engine was
transformative because it was socially beneficial in converting an
original work into an electronic reference tool, and this
outweighed any superseding and commercial use of the images.223
This was similar to the Supreme Court’s analysis in Sony, where
the Court reviewed the public benefits of time-shifting, the start
of a later trend holding that copyright law should “accommodate
new technological developments that benefit the public.”224
However, recalling the Court’s words in Harper & Row several
years later, granting less protection for works when new
technologies make use of them simply because they are perceived
as beneficial to the public would be injurious not only to the
incentivizing goals of copyright law, but also in diminishing
authors’ rights in their creations.225
Courts also seem to rule in favor of transformativeness in
digital library cases because of the general benefit they perceive.
The court in Authors Guild v. Google held that scanning entire
copyrighted works and making them available to supplying
libraries, and publicly displaying snippets of them on the Google
Books library was transformative because of the resulting benefit
of increased access to and identification of books.226 In his
analysis of the Google Books project, Barry Sookman questions
the district court’s rationale in finding the project to be
transformative.227 He states that Google’s only activities were to
provide libraries with digital copies of books, but that the copies
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themselves were not transformative just because they were in a
different format.228 He cites to a long line of case law, which
establishes that “commercial for-profit enterprises have not been
able to stand in the shoes of their customers who make non-profit
[sic] or non-commercial [sic] uses and to claim the benefit of their
transformative non-commercial [sic] activities.”229 The court did
not consider these authorities when finding transformativeness
based on the benefits to readers, scholars, and researchers.230
3.

Transformativeness of Copies in a New Medium Without a
New Purpose

The courts in the cases discussed above have strayed from
the principle established in Texaco that changing the object
embodying the original work does not alone constitute
transformativeness.231 The Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 found that
a search engine automatically transforms a work since it
transforms images into pointers of information232 without
considering whether any new expression was added to the work
itself. The Second Circuit in HathiTrust found that the digital
library was transformative in purpose since the authors of the
original works did not create them for purposes of a full-text
search database,233 implying that the copied works were
automatically transformed since they were digitally reproduced.
However, the Eleventh Circuit in Cambridge University Press did
follow this precedent when it held that the copies on the
electronic reserve system were merely verbatim copies with no
new meaning, and were not transformative just because they had
been converted into an electronic format.234
B.

Cautionary Implications of the Further Expansion of
Transformativeness

The advantages of finding a transformative purpose for
many of the new digital means of reproducing and distributing
works are plenty. Users have increased access to information,
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Id. at 488 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 495.
See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir. 1994).
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007).
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 96 (2d Cir. 2014).
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have more efficient research tools at their disposal, reap
numerous benefits in education, and society in general is able to
make use of a copyright holder’s work for the creation of other
works. In a sense, this does further the Copyright goals of
advancing society’s progress in science and the useful arts.
However, as Barry Sookman stated:
The question is not whether projects like Google Books that
have social benefits should be encouraged. It is whether
authors that invested years of front-end efforts in creating
copyrighted works, and to whom the Copyright Clause seeks to
incentivize to continue to make such investments, should have
the right to authorize these new uses.235

The courts in iParadigms and White both found a
transformative purpose in that the electronic services prevented
plagiarism in a way that did not impair the market for high
school papers236 and created an interactive legal research tool
that did not impair the market for litigation briefs.237 While this
finding may work for these two situations, it creates a slippery
slope in other circumstances. If transformativeness continues to
expand, copyright holders may lose control over their works and
how they are used in digital contexts where a minimally different
purpose is shown and where courts do not perceive a significant
impact on the market.238 They may not even be entitled to
receive a reasonable compensation for the uses, and commercial
for-profit entities such as Google may successfully claim a
nonprofit use of a copyrighted work and benefit from the
transformative
finding
of
their
activities.239
If
transformativeness continues to be so liberally applied—
potentially increasing the amount of fair use outcomes—it could
potentially decrease economic incentives to create new works and
harm the overarching goal of copyright law.240 While profit is not
the sole factor that spurs creativity,241 creators require some
235
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recoupment of their investments to continue to create, and there
is genuine concern that certain works that require a substantial
up-front investment will no longer be created.242 Furthermore,
“digital technology can make libraries and creators competitors
by eliminating all of the distinctions between library and right
holder enabled access except cost. It is virtually impossible to
compete with ‘free.’ ”243 Incentives to continue to create would
diminish, and copyright holders’ exclusive rights to their own
works and control over the market for their works would be
compromised.
Part of the reason for the expansion of transformativeness is
courts’ over-emphasis of a use’s public benefit. Professor Jane
Ginsburg believes this trend is a way that courts “bless uses of
entire works in the perceived public interest.”244 The courts in
HathiTrust and the Google Books case believed that rejecting a
transformative and fair use defense would be adverse to the
public interest, and this was a major reason why they found for
transformativeness and, ultimately, fair use.245 Ginsburg makes
an interesting point that illustrates how some courts may
already decide to find in favor of transformativeness due to
public benefits and then tailor their analyses of the four factors
to match that finding—a phenomenon Professor Barton Beebe
calls “stamped[ing].”246 She provides the example that in Perfect
10, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff failed to show there
was a market for its images for cell phone use.247 Once it was
reminded that fair use is an affirmative defense and the
defendant had the burden of showing it did not interfere in the
market for plaintiff’s work, the court amended its opinion, but
did not change its result.248 This may suggest, as Ginsburg does,

limited is that they cannot tell us how preferences to create are shaped, nourished,
or crushed by the social structures that inevitably frame all human interaction.”).
242
Lois F. Wasoff, If Mass Digitization Is the Problem, Is Legislation the
Solution? Some Practical Considerations Related to Copyright, 34 COLUM. J.L. &
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See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2014);
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246
Beebe, supra note 29, at 555.
247
Ginsburg, supra note 51, at 1413.
248
Id.

FINAL_VALENTE

264

8/25/2016 12:33 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:233

that the burden was of no matter to the court since it had already
decided it would rule in favor of fair use due to the public benefit
of the search engine.249
In determining whether a use qualifies for the fair use
exception, the courts’ overall objective is to determine if the use is
fair and socially beneficial enough that it should overcome the
copyright owner’s monopoly.250 In considering all four factors of
§ 107, a court attempts to ascertain whether the use is so
creative and insightful that it should be allowed to exist to
further the progress of the creative arts in society. Utilizing the
canon of construction of avoiding surplusage,251 if a court
considers whether or not a particular use is socially beneficial
under the first factor, it may defeat the purpose of the fair use
analysis as a whole. Put another way, a character and purpose
that is socially beneficial would determine the social utility and
fair use of the secondary user’s use without analyzing the rest of
the factors.
Congress did not include social benefit as a
consideration in the statute and likely did not intend to make the
rest of the factors it enumerated in § 107 unnecessary after
determining a public benefit in the first factor. For this reason,
courts should not give so much weight to a public benefit as a
transformative purpose or character of a use. The first factor
analysis may be better suited for the nonprofit, educational, and
commerciality inquiry as it was applied in Sony.
C.

Considerations To Abate the Expansion of
Transformativeness

Concern about the current status and future of
transformative use also exists at the legislative level. Two
months after the district court decided the Google Books case,
249
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Samuelson, supra note 215, at 2540 (“A well-recognized strength of the fair
use doctrine is the considerable flexibility it provides in balancing the interests of
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Congress
held
a
subcommittee
hearing
regarding
transformativeness before the House Judiciary Committee’s
subcommittee.252 Among the concerns expressed by the members
present at the hearing were that “specific statutory limitations
have not kept pace with emerging technologies”253 and “that the
transformative use standard has become ‘all things to all
people.’ ”254 Copyright law seeks to protect the interests of the
copyright holder while balancing the interests of society in the
progress of the arts, but recent cases involving mass digitization
have expanded transformativeness to encompass any digitization
with a public benefit.255 Some have argued that the balance of
copyright law has shifted to giving potential infringers the
benefit of the doubt in the increased findings of
transformativeness.256
Furthermore, there is the potential for transformativeness to
grow out of control in future digitization cases where the
purported use is for research and dissemination of information.
A digital library that allows free public access to entire copies of
works could potentially pass the transformativeness inquiry
under the current trend. With the continued expansion of this
concept of transformativeness, it is not unimaginable that a court
may view a digital library with certain search functions similar
to those in White and the Google Books case that gives unfettered
access to whole works as a public benefit with a purpose of
promoting research and information.
Under a fair use
determination, copyright owners would lose control over the
entirety of their works.
While there is an exception for
educational purposes as evidenced by § 107 of the Copyright Act,
many uses can be claimed as educational or furthering research
and information gathering as the courts found in HathiTrust,
White, and the Google Books case. As a result, courts should
carefully examine to what extent the particular digitization
project changes the purpose or character of the original. It is
untenable that verbatim copying, digitizing, and aggregating a
particular source changes its original purpose and character to
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one that is so fundamentally different that it is a different work.
If it serves the same purpose as the original and the only
difference is that it is converted to a different medium such as
the Internet, then this should weigh against a finding of
transformativeness. As the court in Princeton University Press
suggested, a holding that finds verbatim copies of a work to be
transformative—and ultimately fair use, because they were
packaged with other works—contradicts the incentivizing goals
of copyright. An author who loses control over exercising his or
her statutory rights to a copyrighted work because a secondary
user made exact copies of that work, and digitized and
aggregated it with numerous other works, would at least have
reservations about creating further copyrightable works, whether
because of lost income or the appropriation of their personal
creations.
To balance the objectives of copyright law, the harm to the
copyright holder should also be considered. While public benefit
of a use is important to the overall fair use doctrine, it should not
be the pivotal consideration in determining transformativeness.
It is not within the judicial realm to decide what use benefits
society, especially one involving the relatively new practice of
digitization whose benefits may be inconclusive at the
beginning.257 A case such as Perfect 10 may not pass this
analysis, since as a digitized image, it does not add anything new
by being on the Internet and still allows users to view the fullsized copyrighted image as they would have offline. By contrast,
the iParadigms case may pass this digital transformative test
since the digitization of the paper allows the teacher to compare
it to other digitized writings to ascertain originality, which could
not be done offline.
Licensing is another possible solution discussed by both the
Copyright Office and by scholars who are concerned about uses
that profit from a fair use defense.258 While mass digitization
may make licensing difficult due to the large-scale number of
works involved and the barriers to obtaining the necessary rights
to them,259 several recommendations have been made. The
Copyright Office discusses the use of direct licensing as the most
basic option where voluntary agreements are made between
257
258
259
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digitizers and copyright holders on an individual basis.260
Copyright holders and potential licensees could find resources
and information on licensing on the Internet, and could connect
with each other to explore and reach an agreement about
licensing a work.261 The drawbacks of this option, however, are
that potential licensees would need to undertake significant
efforts to identify copyright owners, locate them, and negotiate a
licensing arrangement for voluminous amounts of works.262 The
costs of clearing rights may outweigh the benefits, making a fair
use defense more appealing to potential licensees seeking to
digitize works.263
A second type of licensing scheme, which may reduce
transaction costs, is collective licensing, where copyright holders
authorize third party organizations to administer reproduction,
distribution, and display rights of their works.264 The third party
organizations negotiate licenses with users, collect royalties, and
distribute them to copyright holders.265 Rights are precleared
and prepriced.266 However, collective licensing has primarily
been used for licensing excerpts of works for specified uses, such
as educational uses for coursepacks and e-reserve systems, and
not for entire works or digital distribution.267 There are some
surmountable challenges to collective licensing:
The information that has to be collected is not static. It is
dynamic and changes constantly. Rights are assigned or revert;
companies are bought and sold; individuals move, get married
and divorced and eventually die. All those changes have to be
tracked in the database for millions of works, individuals and
entities.268

While some believe that mass digitization uses are fair and
should be entirely free because of their public benefit and the
lack of feasible licensing structures to enable the uses,269 a better
approach to consider might be Professor Ginsburg’s concept of
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“Permitted but Paid.” She argues that copyright law should
distinguish new distributions from new works, and free fair use
should only be applied to new works, while “Permitted by Paid”
uses would fall under the new distributions category.270 She
divides uses into the categories subsidy uses—socially worthy
redistributions—and market failure uses—where transaction
costs are too high for licensing solutions.271 Furthermore:
Where the use confers a public benefit and the choice is all-ornothing, a fair use outcome is virtually assured. But were
permitted-but-paid an option, we would not be lured by a
dichotomy falsely pitting authors against a perceived social
good. The licensing mechanism would allow both broader
dissemination and provide payment to authors. One might
rejoin that there is no need to license if the use is fair. But in
that class of cases where the use is “fair” only because it
supposedly cannot reasonably be licensed, then permitted-butpaid should replace fair use for free.272

With the unpaid nature of fair use comes potential pressures
on courts which may lead to a distorted analysis, and may
explain why courts have expanded the boundaries of
transformativeness.273 Due to the technological advancements
that are able to increase access to information through digital
means, courts equate transformativeness with the social benefits
they perceive from these uses.274 Having certain uses remain
paid may lead courts to more judiciously analyze the true
transformativeness of a use.
CONCLUSION
Transformativeness has itself undergone a transformation
since its inception in Campbell and during the evolution of the
way works are copied.
The doctrine began as a way of
ascertaining that a secondary use had not superseded the
original work but had made a significant change so that it
provided some new purpose or character. It has since evolved
into a measure of court-perceived social benefits.
With
increasing digitization of copyrighted works, this doctrine that

270
271
272
273
274

Ginsburg, supra note 51, at 1386.
Id.
Id. at 1386–87.
Id. at 1385.
Id.

FINAL_VALENTE

2016]

8/25/2016 12:33 PM

TRANSFORMATIVENESS

269

has already been inconsistently interpreted and applied by courts
has become even murkier. There seems to be little uniformity or
rationale among the way courts have defined and applied a
transformative use test. In the future, this could lead to more
overly-broad findings of transformativeness where a digitized
version of a copyrighted work does not add any new or insightful
purpose or character, and would disrupt the balance of copyright
law objectives. Courts must conduct a more in-depth analysis
when examining digital fair use and take care not to find in favor
of transformativeness simply because the verbatim digital copies
may provide public benefits. In addition, licensing options should
be further examined to find possible solutions, which will
maintain the progress of public knowledge while respecting
copyright owners’ exclusive rights, and may halt the continued
expansion of transformativeness.

